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ABSTRACT
Drawing on the choice and self-referent processing literatures, we 
hypothesized that the act of making consumer choices will augment 
narcissism, because it directs attention to the self (i.e., increases self-
referencing). Results of three experiments provided support for the 
proposed path from choice to narcissism via self-referencing (indirect 
effect), but not for the path from choice to narcissism (total effect). This 
pattern, first reported in Experiment 1, held only for agentic choices 
(e.g., products for personal use), which prompt thoughts about the 
self, and not for communal choices (e.g., charitable organizations), 
which prompt thoughts about others (Experiment 2). Also, this pattern 
generalized across agentic choices of public and private products 
(Experiment 3). We consider theoretical and practical implications.
Consumer choices are ubiquitous (Kahn et al., 2014; Mick, Broniarczyk, & Haidt, 2004). On 
any given day, individuals face choices between consumer goods and services, such as yoga 
or gym, organic or conventional, tea or coffee, car or public transport. Although the act of 
making consumer choices confers psychological benefits, such as personal control restora-
tion and mood regulation (“retail therapy;” Atalay & Meloy, 2011; Rick, Pereira, & Burson, 
2014), this act may also promote attention to individual needs and desires at the expense 
of interpersonal or societal concerns. Indeed, making choices can increase self-referent pro-
cessing, because choice-making involves extensive consideration of past and imagined 
consumption occasions that may bring the self to the fore (Sood & Forehand, 2005). Building 
on this evidence, we examined the possibility that making consumer choices elevates gran-
diose narcissism by increasing self-referent processing.
Consumer choices and grandiose narcissism
Grandiose narcissism refers to a self-absorbed, self-aggrandizing, dominant, and manipula-
tive orientation (Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011; Thomaes, Brummelman, & Sedikides, 2018). 
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this is an Open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribution-nonCommercial-noderivatives license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
KEYWORDS
Choice; consumption; 
identity; narcissism; self-
referencing
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 28 august 2017 
accepted 5 June 2018
Published online 14 June 2018
CONTACT Michail d. Kokkoris  michail.kokkoris@wu.ac.at
§Marketing department, WU Vienna University of economics and Business, Vienna, austria.
 OPEN ACCESS
2   M. D. KOKKORIS ET AL.
It is characterized by a strong sense of specialness and entitlement, fantasies of success and 
power, vanity and lack of empathy, as well as proclivity to exploitation and aggression 
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014; Vazire, Naumann, Rentfrow, 
& Gosling, 2008). Starting in the 1970s (Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2012), narcissism has 
risen over the last decades in the US (and not only; Cai, Kwan, & Sedikides, 2012), culminating 
in what has been termed a “narcissism epidemic” (Twenge & Campbell, 2009; Twenge & 
Foster, 2010; for an opposing view and a response, see Wetzel et al., 2017; and Campbell, 
Twenge, Konrath, Cooper, & Foster, 2018; respectively). This trend has been linked to a 
broader culture of self-love and self-admiration characterizing contemporary societies 
(Campbell, Miller, & Buffardi, 2010; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Cai, 2015), which is reflected in the 
positive associations between narcissism and use of social networking websites (McCain & 
Campbell, 2016) or posting of selfies (Fox & Rooney, 2015; Sorokowski et al., 2015).
Recently, narcissism has attracted empirical attention in consumer contexts. Most of the 
literature has focused on narcissism as a trait, examining how narcissists make consumer 
choices. Their consumption patterns indicate a preference for products with a symbolic (high 
prestige) rather than a utilitarian (pragmatic) value (Cisek et al., 2014; Sedikides, Gregg, Cisek, 
& Hart, 2007), and a proclivity to self-enhance through materialistic possessions (Lee, Gregg, 
& Park, 2013; Sedikides, Hart, & Cisek, in press). Narcissists also engage in word-of-mouth 
communication in order to express themselves and attract attention to themselves (Saenger, 
Thomas, & Johnson, 2013). Moreover, narcissists are more motivated by the pursuit of extrin-
sic goals, such as material wealth, fame, or image, rather than intrinsic goals, such as health, 
relationships, or personal growth (Abeyta, Routledge, & Sedikides, 2017; Hart et al., 2011). 
Other research has highlighted the detrimental effects of consumer entitlement, a concept 
related to narcissism (Boyd & Helms, 2005; Butori, 2010), on customer satisfaction (Martin, 
Jin, & Trang, 2016; Zboja, Laird, & Bouchet, 2016). The current article focuses on narcissism 
as a state, asking how consumer choices influence it.
Whereas a trait refers to an individual’s proclivity toward (or away from) a set of cognitions, 
emotions, or actions, a state is the actual and short-lived set of cognitions, emotions, or actions 
in a particular situation (Fleeson, 2001; Nezlek, 2007; Sedikides, Slabu, Lenton, & Thomaes, 
2017). Narcissism can be conceptualized as a state. Several theoretical models have proposed, 
and evidence has indicated, that narcissism is a regulatory system that varies as a function of 
situational contingencies such as rewards or opportunities for self-enhancement (Campbell 
& Foster, 2007; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Roberts, Woodman, & Sedikides, 2017). Also, levels 
of narcissism fluctuate depending on interdependence construal primes (Giacomin & Jordan, 
2014), felt empathy (Giacomin & Jordan, 2016), use of social media (Horton, Reid, Barber, 
Miracle, & Green, 2014), and experiencing positive outcomes – agentic (e.g., exercising power 
over another person) or communal (e.g., helping another person; Giacomin & Jordan, 2016).
Consumer choices, self-referencing, and state narcissism
A central tenet of our research is that the act of making consumer choices can involve ref-
erence to the self. Along with inspecting, comparing, and selecting among external alter-
natives, choice may also require contrasting alternatives with internal standards until an 
ideal match to the self is achieved. Stated otherwise, the choice process is not only out-
ward-directed, but also inward-directed. Several empirical lines are consistent with the puta-
tive link between choice and self-referencing. For example, choosing among alternatives 
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yields more self-referent processing than judging the same alternatives, because choosing 
involves extensive consideration of past and future consumption occasions that implicate 
the self (Sood & Forehand, 2005). Additionally, according to research inspired by self-per-
ception and self-signaling theories, choice serves as a signal manifesting not only to others 
but also to the self what one likes and what kind of a person one is (Bem, 1967; Bodner & 
Prelec, 2003; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984). Finally, research on associative self-anchoring has 
shown that, when individuals make choices, implicit self-evaluations are transferred from 
the self to the chosen options, so that choosers end up liking what they select, because they 
see themselves reflected in their choices (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Ye & 
Gawronski, 2016; see also Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017).
Another literature implies a link between self-referencing and narcissism (Konrath, Bushman, 
& Grove, 2009), although it does not clarify the direction of this link. For example, the promi-
nence of CEO’s photographs in companies’ annual reports is positively associated with CEO’s 
narcissism levels (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Sedikides & Campbell, 2017). Also, some studies 
have reported a positive relation between first-pronoun use and narcissism (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Fast & Funder, 2010; Raskin & Shaw, 1988; but see Carey et al., 2015). Finally, 
other studies suggest that narcissists have lower self-control, which implies that they are unlikely 
to delay gratification, that they focus more on their immediate desires, and that they are impul-
sive or unconstrained by social norms (Miller et al., 2009; Rose, 2007; Vazire & Funder, 2006).
The above two literature streams point to associations between choice and self-referenc-
ing, and between self-referencing and narcissism. We put it all together in the current 
research. Specifically, we asked whether the act of choosing conduces to a temporary rise 
in narcissism by triggering self-referent processing. We note that narcissism, which implies 
feeling superior to others, is distinct from self-esteem, which implies feeling worthy 
(Brummelman, Gürel, Thomaes, & Sedikides, in press; Brummelman, Thomaes, & Sedikides, 
2016). Hence, we further argue that consumer choices elevate narcissism via self-referencing, 
but not via self-esteem.
However, not all consumer choices are equal in involving thoughts about the self. For 
example, charitable giving is a type of consumer choice that may trigger more thoughts 
about others than about the self (Bagozzi & Moore, 1994; Dickert, Sagara, & Slovic, 2011). 
Prior research has also shown that grandiose narcissists value agency more than communion 
(Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Miller, Price, Gentile, Lynam, & Campbell, 2012; Miller 
et al., 2011). This means that agentic choices lend themselves more to the satisfaction of 
grandiose narcissism motives than communal choices.1 According to our theorizing, choice 
augments narcissism only insofar as it induces self-referent processing. Thus, we postulated 
that narcissism is more likely to be augmented via self-referencing by choices in agentic 
domains (e.g., consumer products), which involve more thinking about the self relative to 
others, rather than in communal domains (e.g., charity causes), which involve more thinking 
about others relative to the self. Choice domain (agentic vs. communal), then, served as a 
moderator. Taken together, we reasoned that consumer choices would elevate narcissism 
via self-referencing only for agentic choices and not for communal ones.
Overview
We conducted a pilot study to validate the dependent measure of state narcissism, and we 
carried out three experiments to evaluate specific hypotheses. In particular, in Experiment 
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1, we tested the hypotheses that making consumer choices elevates narcissism, and that 
this effect occurs via increased self-referent processing. In Experiment 2, we tested the 
boundaries of this mediation effect. We hypothesized that consumer choices augment nar-
cissism via increased self-referencing when they are agentic (e.g., for one’s own use), but not 
when they are communal (e.g., for charity). In Experiments 1–2, we were concerned with 
choices of products consumed in public. In Experiment 3, we wondered whether the effect 
generalizes to products consumed in private. We also wondered whether the effect is local-
ized to product-specific self-referencing (i.e., thinking about the self in relation to a product), 
assessed in Experiments 1–2, vs. general self-referencing (i.e., thinking about the self ), 
assessed in Experiment 3.
Pilot study
In the Pilot Study, we aimed to validate a brief measure of state narcissism for use as a 
dependent variable in the experiments. We adapted 14 items from the 40-item Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988) to reflect a state. We tested the resulting 
scale, labeled SNPI-14, for convergent validity against an established state measure of nar-
cissism, the SNPI-16 (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006; Giacomin & Jordan, 2016).
Method
Participants
Participants were 101 US residents (56 men, 45 women) recruited via MTurk. Their ages 
ranged from 19 to 75 years (M = 35.94, SD = 11.84). A power analysis indicated a minimum 
required sample size of 85 anticipating a correlation of medium size (r = .30), power level of 
.80, and alpha level of .05, and a required sample size of 87 anticipating a paired t-test mean 
difference of small size (d = .30), power level of .80, and alpha level of .05. We opted for a 
small effect size in the paired t-test to reflect a relatively conservative test of the null hypoth-
esis (the two scale means are not significantly different from each other).
Procedure
In developing the SNPI-14, we selected two items from each subscale of the NPI attempting 
to limit the length of the scale while maintaining its breadth. We selected items that loaded 
the highest on the factors, but occasionally opted for items with weaker loadings, that is, 
when it was impossible to adjust such items to reflect state rather than trait (items of the 
“when … then…” variety). However, all selected items were among the top three with highest 
loading on the relevant factor of the original scale, and all had a minimum loading of .5.
The SNPI-14 consisted of 14 items, two from each of seven subscales (authority, superi-
ority, exhibitionism, entitlement, vanity, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency), and it featured a 
forced-choice format as the original NPI (Appendix 1). Sample SNPI-14 items are: (1) “I expect 
a great deal from other people, right now” (narcissistic statement) vs. “Right now, I like to do 
things for other people” (non-narcissistic statement); and (2) “Right now, I think I am an 
extraordinary person” (narcissistic statement) vs. “I think I am much like everybody else, right 
now” (non-narcissistic statement). Participants completed the two brief narcissism scales, 
the SNPI-14 and the SNPI-16, in random order. Reliabilities for both scales were adequate 
(α = .77 for SNPI-14; α = .86 for SNPI-16).
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Results and discussion
The two scales were positively correlated, r = .86, p < .001. A paired samples t-test showed 
no difference in means between the SNPI-14 (M = 4.83, SD = 3.22) and the SNPI-16 (M = 4.58, 
SD = 4.07), t(100)=-1.19, p = .239, d = .07, 95% CI = [-.662, .167]. Thus, the SNPI-14 has con-
vergent validity with an established state narcissism scale, the SNPI-16. Critically, unlike the 
SNPI-16, the SNPI-14 represents all seven subscales of the original NPI with an even number 
of items. Moreover, the overlapping items in the two scales are only five. Taken together, the 
results of the Pilot Study support the use of the SNPI-14 as a new measure of state narcissism, 
which has adequate reliability, features convergent validity, and covers equally all facets of 
narcissism.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis that making consumer choices augments narcis-
sism by increasing (product-specific) self-referencing.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 150 US residents (81 men, 69 women) recruited through MTurk. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 74 years (M = 33.75, SD = 11.71). A power analysis for mediation 
tests using MedPower (Kenny, 2017; February) indicated a minimum required sample size 
of 113 based on an indirect effect of medium size (an ab path of .09), power level of .80, and 
alpha level of .05. In addition, empirical estimates to detect a medium to small mediation 
effect (an a path of .26 and a b path of .26, power level of .80, and alpha level of .05) would 
require a sample size of 148 using bias-corrected bootstrap procedures (Fritz & MacKinnon, 
2007). Therefore, a sample size of 150 would suffice to test our hypothesis. The design 
involved a single factor (choice: present vs. absent) manipulated on a between-subjects 
basis.
Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to conditions (choice present, choice absent). In both 
conditions, we presented participants with nine choice sets, each comprising images of 
three consumer products of the same category (backpacks, jackets, jeans, mugs, shoes, sofas, 
sunglasses, t-shirts, watches). In the choice-present condition, we instructed participants to 
choose any option that they liked, irrespective of budget constraints. In the choice-absent 
condition, we instructed them to choose the option that was in grayscale (a randomly deter-
mined option was in grayscale in each choice set). In both conditions, the “next” button 
always appeared after 5 s to ensure that participants took the time to inspect the options. 
Participants then rated the options in terms of attractiveness and closeness to their own 
taste (α = .77). As a manipulation check, they indicated their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree) with six items measuring self-agency (α = .88), adapted from Hadi and 
Block (2014). Sample items are: “I was able to choose products,” “I felt obligated to select the 
products I selected” (reverse-scored).
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Next, participants responded to the state narcissism measure, the SNPI-14 (α = .78). 
Subsequently, they completed a 2-item state self-esteem measure: “Right now, I feel good 
about myself,” “Right now, I have high self-esteem” (α = .94). The first item is part of the State 
Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), the second one is the Single-Item Self-Esteem 
Scale (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Then, a self-referencing measure (adapted from 
Sood & Forehand, 2005) followed, which consisted of three items: “To what extent did you 
visualize yourself making use of the products you saw?,” “To what extent did you consider 
personal experiences that included the products you saw?,” “To what extent did you visualize 
yourself in social situations involving the products you saw?” (α = .81). Finally, participants 
indicated how easy or difficult they found the task with the product pictures (1 = easy, 7 = dif-
ficult), and answered demographic questions (sex, age, ethnicity).
Results
Manipulation check
As intended, the choice-present condition induced a higher sense of self-agency (M = 5.85, 
SD = 1.07) than the choice-absent condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.25), t(148) = −11.92, p < .001, 
d = 1.93, 95% CI = [−2.623, −1.877]. The manipulation was effective.
Options ratings
The products used as experimental stimuli were rated positively (M = 4.85, SD = 1.18) and 
significantly higher from the scale midpoint, t(149) = 8.88, p < .001, d = 1.46, 95% CI = [.664, 
1.043]. The products were rated equivalently in the two conditions, t(148) = −0.94, p = .351, 
d = −0.15, 95% CI = [−.561, .200].
Main findings
The choice-present condition (M = 4.84, SD = 1.17) instigated more self-referent processing 
than the choice-absent condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.47), t(148) = −7.57, p < .001, d = 1.23, 95% 
CI = [−2.071, −1.202]. Unexpectedly, there was no total effect2 of choice on state narcissism, 
t(148) = 0.13, p = .897, d = 0.02, 95% CI = [−.965, 1.100] (Table 1). There was only a marginal 
total effect of choice on state self-esteem, indicating that the choice-present condition 
(M = 5.01, SD = 1.42) yielded higher state self-esteem than the choice-absent condition 
(M = 4.61, SD = 1.52), t(148) = −1.66, p = .098, d = 0.27, 95% CI = [−.873, .075] (Table 1). 
1.18* (-1.25**)
State Narcissism
Choice 
(absent vs. 
present)
0.72***1.64***
Self-referencing
Figure 1. Indirect effect of choice (0 = absent; 1 = present) on state narcissism through self-referencing in 
experiment 1 (the direct effect, controlling for self-referencing, appears in parenthesis).
note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are provided along the paths. *no zero between llCI and UlCI. **p < .05. ***p 
< .001.
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However, several researchers have advocated abandoning the requirement of a significant 
total effect before examining indirect effects (Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 
2011; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). We proceeded, then, with the mediation hypothesis that 
choice elevates state narcissism by increasing self-referencing, even though the total effect 
of choice on narcissism was not significant. To this end, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Model 4; Hayes, 2013) with 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 
5,000 bootstrap samples. We entered choice (dummy coded: 0 = absent, 1 = present) as the 
independent variable (X), state narcissism as the dependent variable (Y), and product-specific 
self-referencing as the putative mediator (M). We obtained a mean indirect effect of B = 1.18, 
SE = 0.37, 95% CI = [.512, 1.956], suggesting that choice elevates narcissism via self-refer-
encing (Figure 1). Critically, choice did not exert an indirect effect on narcissism via self-es-
teem, B = 0.37, SE = 0.24, 95% CI = [−.049, .882], even though self-esteem was marginally 
higher in the choice-present than in the choice-absent condition. Therefore, choice led to 
narcissism by increasing self-referencing, but not self-esteem.3 Although the total effect of 
choice on narcissism was not significant, B = −0.07, SE = 0.52, p = .897, 95% CI = [−1.100, 
.965], the direct effect of choice on narcissism became significant after controlling for self-ref-
erencing in the model, B = −1.25, SE = 0.59, p = .036, 95% CI = [−2.411, −.083]. The finding 
that the relation between choice and narcissism became stronger following inclusion of 
self-referencing may flag self-referencing as a suppressor variable, which, if such, would 
cloak the effect of choice on narcissism by its omission. Robustness checks further showed 
that the indirect effect of choice on narcissism remained significant after controlling for 
option ratings, B = 1.21, SE = 0.36, 95% CI = [.581, 1.998], and task difficulty, B = 1.11, SE = 0.38, 
95% CI = [.445, 1.947]. We present correlations among all variables in Table 2.
State Narcissism
Choice 
(absent vs. 
present)
Self-referencing
Domain 
(agentic vs. 
communal)
Figure 2. Conceptual graph of moderated mediation model in experiment 2.
Table 2. Correlations among all variables in experiment 1.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
1 2 3 4
1. State narcissism (SnPI-14) – – – –
2. Self-referencing .25** – – –
3. State self-esteem .42*** .26** – –
4. Options attractiveness .08 .42*** .34*** –
5. task difficulty .24** .02 .00 −.11
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 revealed no total effect of consumer choice on narcissism. Making 
consumer choices per se did not render participants more or less narcissistic. However, the 
results were consistent with our theorizing that making consumer choices augments nar-
cissism by increasing product-specific self-referencing. This finding converges with prior 
work indicating that choice induces self-referencing (Sood & Forehand, 2005), and extends 
that work in illustrating that, by doing so, choice contributes to rises in narcissism.
The obtained indirect effect is informative. Indirect effects can furnish insights into paths 
through which an independent variable exerts its influence on a dependent variable (Rucker 
et al., 2011). In our case, although choice had no total effect on narcissism, taking self-refer-
encing into consideration revealed a path via which choice promotes narcissism. Furthermore, 
self-referencing may qualify as a suppressor variable. Suppressor variables, albeit underrep-
resented in research designs, can provide the “opportunity to acquire a deeper understand-
ing of the relationships among variables” (Rucker et al., 2011, p. 368). Hence, taking into 
account self-referencing may clarify the association between consumer choice and narcis-
sism, even though it appears as if the two are unrelated. We return to the issue in General 
Discussion. In the subsequent experiments, we focused on this indirect effect attempting 
to improve our understanding of it by testing its boundary conditions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether choice domain (agentic vs. communal) moderates 
the indirect effect of choice on narcissism via self-referencing. (See Figure 2 for a schematic 
depiction of the model.) Given that the dependent measure reflects agentic and not com-
munal narcissism, we hypothesized that the pattern obtained in Experiment 1 would hold 
only for agentic choices (consumer products) and not for communal choices (charity causes).
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 240 US residents recruited from MTurk. We excluded 30 participants who 
had taken part in the previous experiment. The final sample comprised 210 participants (125 
men, 85 women) ranging in age from 18 to 72 years (M = 31.50, SD = 12.36). Given that – to 
the best of our knowledge – no application exists for the sample size estimation of condi-
tional indirect effects, we opted for a sample size approximately double that of Experiment 
1, as the current experiment featured the addition of an independent variable. Specifically, 
the experiment used a 2 (choice: present vs. absent) × 2 (domain: agentic vs. communal) 
between-subjects design.
Procedure
We modeled closely the procedure after that of Experiment 1. The manipulation of choice 
was identical to Experiment 1’s. We manipulated domain by asking participants to make 
either agentic or communal choices. For the agentic domain, we used the same choice sets 
as in Experiment 1 (consumer goods). For the communal domain, we used an equal number 
of choice sets (nine) with the logos of three charity options each (animals, cancer, 
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environment, homeless, human rights, humanitarian aid, hunger, children, poverty). For 
example, participants in the communal domain indicated either to which organization 
(American Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, UNICEF) they would donate money (choice 
present) or which organization’s logo was in grayscale (choice absent). Two manipulation 
checks followed, one for choice (the self-agency measure of Experiment 1; α = .91) and 
another for domain (“The options depicted in the pictures referred to one’s own needs,” “The 
options depicted in the pictures referred to others’ needs;” α = .58). We included the same 
control variables as in Experiment 1: options ratings (attractiveness, liking, satisfaction; 
1 = not at all, 7 = very much; α = .85) and difficulty (1 = easy, 7 = difficult). We also included 
two new, exploratory control variables: mood (1 = bad, 7 = good) and task involvement (five 
items; e.g., of concern to me, meant a lot to me; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; 
α = .94). Finally, we assessed state narcissism (α = .75), state self-esteem (α = .93), and self-ref-
erencing (α = .86), as in Experiment 1.
Results
Manipulation checks
As intended, self-agency was higher in the choice-present (M = 5.81, SD = 1.02) than 
choice-absent (M = 3.17, SD = 1.53) condition, F(1, 206) = 215.89, p < .001, η2 = .51. Also as 
intended, options were rated as more self-referent vs. other-referent in the agentic (M = 4.00, 
SD = 1.55) than communal (M = 2.41, SD = 1.16) domain, F(1, 206) = 91.63, p < .001, η2 = .31. 
The manipulations were effective.
Figure 3. Mean self-referencing as a function of choice (absent vs. present) and domain (communal vs. 
agentic) in experiment 2. error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Options ratings
The experimental stimuli were rated positively (M = 5.16, SD = 1.13 for the communal domain, 
and M = 5.16, SD = 1.09 for the agentic domain). They were also rated significantly higher 
from the scale midpoint, t(106) = 11.02, p < .001, d = 2.14, 95% CI = [.954, 1.373] for the agen-
tic domain, and t(102) = 10.38, p < .001, d = 2.06, 95% CI = [.937, 1.382] for the communal 
domain. We obtained no significant main effects or interactions, ps > .17, Fs < 1.94.
Main findings
We implemented an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with choice and domain as independent 
variables, and self-referencing as a dependent variable. We obtained a main effect of choice, 
F(1, 206) = 17.71, p < .001, η2 = .08: Choice present (M = 4.55, SD = 1.48) induced more self-ref-
erencing than choice absent (M = 3.62, SD = 1.69). We also obtained a main effect of domain, 
F(1, 206) = 5.35, p = .022, η2 = .03: Self-referencing was higher in the agentic (M = 4.32, 
SD = 1.69) than the communal (M = 3.81, SD = 1.58) domain. Importantly, these main effects 
were qualified by a marginal interaction, F(1, 206) = 3.37, p = .068, η2 = .02 (Figure 3). 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons (p = .0125) revealed that self-referencing was higher in the 
agentic (M = 4.98, SD = 1.30) than communal (M = 4.08, SD = 1.53) domain, p = .004, when 
participants had a choice (choice-present condition), but self-referencing did not differ in 
the agentic (M = 3.67, SD = 1.79) and communal (M = 3.57, SD = 1.60) domains, p < .001, 
when participants lacked a choice (choice-absent condition). A similar ANOVA with state 
narcissism as the dependent variable yielded no significant main effects or interactions, 
ps > .19, Fs < 1.70 (Table 1). A similar ANOVA with state self-esteem as the dependent variable 
yielded only a significant main effect of domain, such that the agentic domain (M = 4.86, 
SD = 1.40) induced higher self-esteem than the communal domain (M = 4.44, SD = 1.67), F(1, 
206) = 4.00, p = .047, η2 = .02. No other main or interaction effects were significant, ps > .78, 
Fs < 0.08 (Table 1).
We proceeded to evaluate the hypothesis that the indirect effect of choice on state nar-
cissism via self-referencing holds only for the agentic and not for the communal domain. In 
particular, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8; Hayes, 2013) to test a moderated 
mediation model with a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 
bootstrap samples. We entered choice (dummy coded: 0 = absent, 1 = present) as the 
Agentic: 0.48* (-0.84)
Communal: 0.19 (-0.30) 
State Narcissism
Choice 
(absent vs. 
present)
0.37**
Agentic: 1.31***
Communal: 0.51
Self-referencing
Figure 4. Indirect effect of choice (0 = absent; 1 = present) on state narcissism through self-referencing 
for agentic and communal domains in experiment 2 (the direct effect, controlling for self-referencing, 
appears in parenthesis).
note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are provided along the paths. *no zero between llCI and UlCI. **p < .01. ***p 
< .001.
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independent variable (X), state narcissism as the dependent variable (Y), product-specific 
self-referencing as the putative mediator (M), and domain (dummy coded: 0 = communal, 
1 = agentic) as the putative moderator (W). The index of moderated mediation yielded a 
confidence interval that did not include zero, 95% CI = [.015, .828], suggesting a significant 
moderated mediation (Figure 4). Specifically, the indirect effect of choice on state narcissism 
was significant in the agentic domain, B = 0.48, SE = 0.22, 95% CI = [.151, 1.034], but not in 
the communal domain, B = 0.19, SE = 0.14, 95% CI = [−.013, .569]. Critically, a similar mod-
erated mediation model with state self-esteem as the mediator was not significant, 95% 
CI = [−.466, .664]. Therefore, domain moderates the indirect effect of choice on narcissism 
through self-referencing, but not through self-esteem.
Controlling for self-referencing, there was no significant direct effect of choice on state 
narcissism, either in regards to the agentic domain, B = −0.30, SE = 0.59, p = .167, 95% 
CI = [−1.467, .873], or the communal domain, B = −0.84, SE = 0.60, p = .609, 95% CI = [−2.028, 
0.348]. Finally, robustness checks showed that the moderated mediation model remained 
significant after controlling for option ratings, 95% CI = [.006, .826], task difficulty, 95% 
CI = [.028, .866], task involvement, 95% CI = [.068, .949], and mood, 95% CI = [.010, .697]. We 
present correlations among all variables in Table 3.
Discussion
Experiment 2 demonstrated that domain of choice moderates the indirect effect of choice 
on narcissism via product-specific self-referencing. That is, Experiment 2 replicated 
Experiment 1 in showing that making a choice elevates narcissism via self-referencing in the 
agentic domain (consumer products), but not in the communal domain (charity causes). 
Again, there were no significant total effects of choice on narcissism, indicating that it is only 
through thinking about the self that choice augments narcissism. In all, agentic consumer 
choices are likely to raise narcissism due to relatively strong self-referent processing. 
Communal consumer choices, on the contrary, do not produce the same amount of thinking 
about the self, as they direct attention to others’ needs or wants rather than one’s own, and 
so are less likely to augment narcissism.
Experiment 3
Experiment 1 showed that consumer choices increase self-referencing, which predict rises 
in narcissism. Experiment 2 established a boundary of this effect, restricting it to agentic 
rather than communal choices. Yet, close inspection of the stimuli used so far suggests that 
Table 3. Correlations among all variables in experiment 2.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. State narcissism (SnPI-14) – – – – – –
2. Self-referencing .18** – – – – –
3. State self-esteem .34*** .25*** – – – –
4. Options attractiveness .08 .30*** .30*** – – –
5. task difficulty .05 .06 −.04 −.09 – –
6. Mood .18* .43*** .40*** .41*** −.14* –
7. Involvement −.01 −.41*** −.22** −.32*** −.09 −.49***
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almost all of them can be classified as products that are consumed in public and hence entail 
self-presentational concerns. Agentic choices, then, may have been confounded with public 
choices (Bearden & Etzel, 1982). Public (vs. private) products are more often used to express 
one’s identity and to draw inferences about others’ identities (Berger & Heath, 2007). As such, 
choosing among public (vs. private) products may induce stronger self-presentational con-
siderations and higher self-referencing. We wondered, in Experiment 3, whether the obtained 
effect (consumer choice augmenting narcissism via self-referencing) is bounded only to 
public products or extends to private products as well.
We had an additional goal. In Experiments 1–2, we assessed self-referencing in relation 
to the products in question (product-specific self-referencing; Sood & Forehand, 2005). It is 
possible, though, that this form of self-referencing is not necessary for the effect to occur. 
That is, choice of agentic products may conduce to augmented narcissism via general self-ref-
erencing (i.e., thoughts about the self that are untethered to products). We tested this pos-
sibility in Experiment 3.
Pre-test
We first pre-tested the products for use in the main experiment. In particular, we examined 
whether participants perceived these products as public or private. We recruited 142 US 
residents (94 men, 48 women), aged between 18 and 75 years (M = 33.56, SD = 12.84), on 
the online crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic. This was a convenience sample, as we 
attached the pre-test on the back of an unrelated study. Participants received brief descrip-
tions of public products (“A public product is one that other people are aware you possess 
and use. If they want to, others can identify the product with little or no difficulty”) and 
private products (“A private product is one used at home or in private at some location. 
Except for your immediate family, people would be unaware that you own or use the prod-
uct”) adjusted from Bearden and Etzel (1982). Then, they were presented with a list of prod-
ucts, and rated how public or private each was (1 = public, 6 = private). The list included the 
nine products used in Experiments 1–2, assumed to be public (jeans, jacket, backpack, sun-
glasses, sneakers, sofa, mug, polo shirt, watch), and 10 new products assumed to be private 
(mattress, painkillers, hand soap, hammer, toothpaste, stapler, glass cleaner, scissors, dish 
soap, vacuum cleaner). In addition, participants rated the extent to which (1) each product 
contributed to self-expression, namely, a person’s ability to express their identity (1 = not at 
all, 6 = very much), and (2) people used each product to make inferences about others, 
namely, whether they learn a lot about a person based on the specific product choice (1 = not 
at all, 6 = very much) (Berger & Heath, 2007).
Participants rated the nine products used in Experiments 1–2 (M = 2.24, SD = 0.98; α = .86) 
as more public than the 10 new products (M = 3.91, SD = 1.46; α = .94), t(141) = 12.56, 
p < .001. Moreover, participants rated the products used in Experiments 1–2 (M = 4.32, 
SD = 1.07; α = .92) as more suitable for self-expression than the new products (M = 1.87, 
SD = 0.95; α = .92), t(141) = 23.54, p < .001, and also as more suitable for making inferences 
about others (M = 4.01, SD = 1.06; α = .92) than the new products (M = 1.77, SD = 0.87; 
α = .91), t(141) = 22.19, p < .001. We proceeded to remove painkillers from the list of private 
products, as painkillers had the lowest score on the public-private dimension and the highest 
scores on self-expression and inference-making. Therefore, in the main experiment, we used 
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the remaining nine products in the private condition and the nine products of Experiments 
1–2 in the public condition.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 253 US residents (149 women, 104 men) aged between 18 and 75 years 
(M = 33.16, SD = 11.48). They were recruited from MTurk, and had not taken part in our 
previous experiments. We aimed for a sample size similar to that of Experiment 2, given the 
parallel design. In particular, we used in Experiment 3 a 2 (choice: absent vs. present) × 2 
(domain: private vs. public) between-subjects design.
Procedure
We modeled closely the procedure after that of Experiment 1, with the addition of a private 
domain condition. For the manipulation of choice (present vs. absent), we used the same 
instructions as in Experiments 1–2 (make a choice vs. select the one in greyscale). For the 
manipulation of domain, we proceeded as follows. In the public condition, we used the same 
choice sets as in Experiments 1–2 (agentic). In the private condition, we used three pictures 
for each one of the nine products (mattress, hand soap, hammer, toothpaste, stapler, glass 
cleaner, scissor, dish soap, vacuum cleaner).
Further, we implemented the same self-agency measure as in Experiments 1–2 for a choice 
manipulation check (α = .85) and the same measures as in the pre-test (private/public, self-ex-
pressive, inferential) for a domain manipulation check. We also measured options attractive-
ness (1 = not at all attractive, 7 = very attractive), difficulty (1 = easy, 7 = difficult), and mood 
(1 = bad, 7 = good) as control variables. In addition, we assessed state narcissism (α = .64) 
and state self-esteem (α = .90) as in Experiments 1–2. Finally, we assessed self-referencing 
in two ways. First, we used the same items as in prior experiments, addressing product-spe-
cific self-referencing (α = .84). Second, we added three items addressing general self-refer-
encing. They were: “To what extent did you think about yourself and your needs?”, “To what 
extent did you think about yourself and your wishes?”, “To what extent did you think about 
yourself in general?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; α = .96).
Results
Manipulation checks
As intended, self-agency was higher in the choice-present (M = 5.99, SD = 0.80) than in the 
choice-absent (M = 3.99, SD = 1.34) condition, F(1, 249) = 211.41, p < .001, η2 = .46. Also as 
intended, products were rated as more public (vs. private) in the public (M = 1.95, SD = 1.17) 
than in the private (M = 3.23, SD = 1.79) condition, F(1, 249) = 48.04, p < .001, η2 = .16; more 
self-expressive in the public (M = 4.31, SD = 1.38) than in the private (M = 2.34, SD = 1.21) 
condition, F(1, 249) = 147.44, p < .001, η2 = .37; and lending themselves to inference-making 
more in the public (M = 4.15, SD = 1.13) than in the private (M = 2.54, SD = 1.29) condition, 
F(1, 249) = 111.54, p < .001, η2 = .31. Both manipulations were effective.
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Options ratings
The experimental stimuli were rated positively both in the private (M = 4.67, SD = 1.34) and 
in the public (M = 4.98, SD = 1.18) condition, F(1, 249) = 3.99, p = .047, η2 = .02. Importantly, 
the products were rated significantly higher from the scale midpoint both in the private 
condition, t(124) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 1.01, 95% CI = [.435, .909], and in the public condition, 
t(127) = 9.41, p < .001, d = 1.67, 95% CI = [.777, 1.191].
Main findings
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on product-specific self-referencing yielded a main effect of choice, F(1, 
249) = 96.04, p < .001, η2 = .28: Choice present (M = 4.87, SD = 1.31) induced more self-ref-
erencing than choice absent (M = 2.98, SD = 1.74). It also yielded a marginal main effect of 
domain, F(1, 249) = 3.78, p = .053, η2 = .02: Public products (M = 4.13, SD = 1.89) induced 
more self-referencing than private products (M = 3.73, SD = 1.69). These effects were unqual-
ified by the interaction, F(1, 249) = 0.01, p = .917, η2 < .001. A similar ANOVA on general 
self-referencing produced a choice main effect, F(1, 249) = 139.13, p < .001, η2 = .36: Choice 
present (M = 5.38, SD = 1.49) induced more self-referencing than choice absent (M = 2.94, 
SD = 1.81). It also produced a marginal domain main effect, F(1, 249) = 3.03, p = .083, η2 = .01: 
Public products (M = 4.96, SD = 2.05) induced more self-referencing than private products 
(M = 3.97, SD = 2.05). These effects were also unqualified by the interaction, F(1, 249) = 0.66, 
p = .417, η2 = .004. Finally, a similar ANOVA on state narcissism produced no main effects or 
interactions, ps > .11, Fs < 2.45, and the same was true for an ANOVA on state self-esteem, 
ps > .24, Fs < 1.38 (Table 1).
Public: 0.32 (-0.22) 
Private: 0.70a (0.11)
State Narcissism
Choice 
(absent vs. 
present)
0.30**Public: 1.91***
Private: 1.87***
Product-specific 
Self-referencing
Public: 0.32 (-0.30) 
Private: 0.70a (-0.09)
State Narcissism
Choice 
(absent vs. 
present)
0.29**Public: 2.28***
Private: 2.61***
General 
Self-referencing
Figure 5. Indirect effect of choice (0 = absent; 1 = present) on state narcissism through product-specific 
self-referencing (upper panel) and general self-referencing (lower panel) for public and private products 
in experiment 3 (the direct effect, controlling for self-referencing, appears in parenthesis.
note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are provided along the paths. ap < .10. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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In order to examine whether the indirect effect of choice on state narcissism via self-ref-
erencing held both for private and public products, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Model 8; Hayes, 2013) to test a moderated mediation model with a 95% bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. First, we tested the model 
with product-specific self-referencing as a putative mediator. We entered choice (dummy 
coded: 0 = absent, 1 = present) as the independent variable (X), state narcissism as the 
dependent variable (Y), product-specific self-referencing as the putative mediator (M), and 
domain (dummy coded: 0 = private, 1 = public) as the putative moderator (W). Results showed 
that the indirect effect of choice on state narcissism was significant both for public products, 
B = 0.57, SE = 0.23, 95% CI = [.147, 1.052] and for private products, B = 0.56, SE = 0.21, 95% 
CI = [.163, .993]. Moreover, the index of moderated mediation, 0.01, SE = 0.13, yielded a con-
fidence interval that included zero, 95% CI = [−.211, .296], suggesting that the two indirect 
effects did not differ significantly from each other (Figure 5, upper panel). Next, we tested 
the same model with general self-referencing as the putative mediator. Results indicated 
that the indirect effect of choice on state narcissism was significant both for public products, 
B = 0.65, SE = 0.26, 95% CI = [.211, 1.223] and for private products, B = 0.75, SE = 0.27, 95% 
CI = [.255, 1.351]. Moreover, the index of moderated mediation, −0.10, SE = 0.13, yielded a 
confidence interval that included zero, 95% CI = [−.421, .113], suggesting that the two indi-
rect effects did not differ significantly from each other (Figure 5, lower panel). These findings 
reveal that (1) choice induces state narcissism via self-referencing irrespective of the public 
or private nature of the products in question, and (2) this effect holds for both product-spe-
cific and general self-referencing.
Critically, a similar moderated mediation model with state self-esteem as the mediator 
was not significant, 0.10, SE = 0.15, 95% CI = [−.146, .493], and neither were the indirect 
effects for public products, B = 0.13, SE = 0.11, 95% CI = [−.037, .412] or for private products, 
B = 0.03, SE = 0.10, 95% CI = [−.172, .245]. These results converge with all previous findings 
that choice induces state narcissism only via self-referencing and not via self-esteem. Also, 
self-referencing, be it product-specific or general, did not qualify the results. Controlling for 
product-specific self-referencing, there was no significant direct effect of choice on state 
narcissism, either in the public condition, B = −0.25, SE = 0.50, p = .624, 95% CI = [−1.227, 
.738] or the private condition, B = 0.15, SE = 0.50, p = .767, 95% CI = [−.840, 1.137]. Similarly, 
controlling for general self-referencing, there was no significant direct effect of choice on 
state narcissism, either in the public condition, B = −0.33, SE = 0.51, p = .516, 95% CI = [−1.330, 
.669] or in the private condition, B = −0.05, SE = 0.53, p = .931, 95% CI = [−1.086, .994]. Finally, 
robustness checks indicated that the two conditional indirect effects (public, private) 
Table 4. Correlations among all variables in experiment 3.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
  1 2 3 4 5 6
1. State narcissism (SnPI-14) – – – – – –
2. Product-specific self-referencing .20** – – – – –
3. General self-referencing .21** .84*** – – – –
4. State self-esteem .22** .17** .15* – – –
5. Options attractiveness .08 .43*** .40*** .11 – –
6. task difficulty −.02 .03 .05 .01 −.09 –
7. Mood .15* .35*** .24*** .20** .44*** −.06
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remained significant after controlling for option ratings, task difficulty, and mood. We present 
correlations among all variables in Table 4.
Discussion
Experiment 3 made three substantive contributions. First, it provided an additional (the 
third) replication of the indirect effect of consumer choice on state narcissism via self-refer-
encing, attesting to the effect’s robustness. As before, we found no total effect of choice on 
narcissism. Second, the experiment indicated that the effect holds not only for choices of 
public products, as was the case in Experiments 1–2, but also for choices of private products. 
Even though self-referencing was stronger for public products, choosing among products 
consumed privately induced sufficient self-referencing to raise narcissism. Third, the exper-
iment showed that the effect generalizes across product-specific self-referencing and general 
self-referencing: Thinking about the self in relation to products is as effective in augmenting 
narcissism as simply thinking about the self.
In Experiment 2, we found that agentic choices, but not communal choices, raised nar-
cissism via self-referencing. Choice domain emerged as a moderator. However, in Experiment 
3, product domain did not emerge as a moderator, although self-referencing was higher for 
public than private products. This seeming paradox has an explanation. In contrast to making 
communal choices (choosing for charities), making agentic choices among private products 
entails self-referencing to a large extent, too. After all, choosing among private products is 
a type of agentic choice and thus invokes the self to a considerable degree – certainly much 
more than communal choices do. The data are consistent with this interpretation. In 
Experiment 3, product-specific self-referencing in the choice-present/private condition 
(M = 4.67, SD = 1.06) was significantly higher from the scale midpoint, t(61) = 4.99, p < .001, 
d = 1.28, 95% CI = [.403, .941], and that was the case also for general self-referencing (M = 5.28, 
SD = 1.52), t(61) = 6.65, p < .001, d = 1.70, 95% CI = [.898, 1.672]. This was not so, however, 
for communal choices. In Experiment 2, self-referencing in the choice-present/communal 
condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.53) was not significantly higher from the scale midpoint, 
t(47) = 0.38, p = .713, d = 1.77, 95% CI = [−.360, .527], indicating that participants did not 
generate many thoughts about themselves when choosing charities. Hence, although the 
distinction between agentic and communal choices provides a meaningful boundary con-
dition of the obtained effect, the distinction between public and private products does not 
do so, because choice of private products elicits a fair amount of self-referencing.
General discussion
Drawing on various literature streams regarding self and choice, we developed theory-driven 
hypotheses about the relation between consumer choice and narcissism. In particular, we 
hypothesized that the act of choice augments state narcissism by increasing self-referent 
processing. Results of three experiments showed that choice has an indirect positive effect 
on narcissism via self-referencing, but no total effect. Experiment 1 demonstrated that mak-
ing consumer choices in the agentic domain (i.e., for one’s own self ) elevates narcissism by 
increasing self-referent processing. In Experiment 2, choice domain emerged as a moderator: 
agentic choices (e.g., consumer products) raised narcissism via increased self-referencing, 
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but communal choices (e.g., charity causes) did not. Experiment 3 illustrated that this finding 
generalizes to public and private products.
Critical for the interpretation of these findings is an understanding of what an indirect 
effect implies in the absence of a total effect. Such a pattern may constitute evidence that 
two opposing processes operate in parallel and suppress a total effect (Hayes, 2009; Rucker 
et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2010). That is, the indirect effect does not translate into a total effect, 
because an opposite force (i.e., another indirect effect in the opposite direction) is at work, 
which eventually cancels out the first indirect effect leaving the total effect intact. For exam-
ple, prior investigations have found no total effect of environmentally-friendly behavior on 
positive feelings, but instead reported an indirect effect via enhancement of a positive 
self-image (Venhoeven, Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2016). Thus, although engaging in environmen-
tally-friendly behavior leads to a positive self-image, which in turn makes individuals feel 
good, this type of behavior has no overall impact on how good individuals feel. The reason 
might be that environmentally-friendly behavior not only boosts one’s self-image, but also 
has negative side effects (e.g., social costs, financial costs) that undermine positive feelings. 
Similarly, in our research, making consumer choices increases thoughts about the self, which 
in turn elevate narcissism. Yet, consumer choices do not cause narcissism on their own. 
Making consumer choices may have another, concurrent effect, which counteracts the indi-
rect effect through self-referencing and decreases narcissism, leaving the total effect on 
narcissism seemingly intact. Although choice induces self-referencing, which facilitates nar-
cissism, it may also elicit other states that inhibit narcissism. Self-affirmation could be an 
example of such a state.
Self-affirmation refers to endorsement of values that demonstrate one’s adequacy and 
help maintain “an image of oneself as able to control important adaptive and moral outcomes 
in one’s life” (Cohen & Sherman, 2014, p. 336). Making consumer choices may trigger self-af-
firmation. For example, self-affirmation can be elicited through the choice of aesthetic con-
sumer products (Townsend & Sood, 2012) or status consumer goods (Sivanathan & Pettit, 
2010). Self-affirmation in turn can alleviate maladaptive behaviors by reducing defensive 
biases (Cohen & Sherman, 2014), especially among narcissists (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, 
Cohen, & Denissen, 2009). Thus, it is possible that consumer choices, besides inducing self-ref-
erencing, simultaneously engender self-affirmation, which in turn counteract the effect of 
self-referencing on narcissism, resulting in no total effect. Our data support the possibility 
that another force, operating in parallel to self-referencing, acted in the opposite direction, 
countervailing its effect on narcissism. In support of this possibility, the direct effect of choice 
on narcissism after controlling for self-referencing had a negative sign in Experiments 1–3, 
although it was statistically significant only in Experiment 1. Choice, then, may even lower 
narcissism, after controlling for self-referencing, because of increased self-affirmation. 
Follow-up work needs to examine this possibility.
By manipulating choice domain in Experiment 2, we used a moderation-of-process 
approach to examine further the role of self-referencing and clarify the underlying mecha-
nism (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). When choices did not 
involve extensive self-referent processing in the first place, as is the case of charity, the 
indirect effect of choice on narcissism was no longer present. This calls for a caveat: It is not 
consumer choices per se that raise narcissism, but rather the degree of self-referencing 
involved in choosing. Assuming that consumer choices vary in the extent to which they 
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involve thoughts about the self, self-referencing might be the key in explaining when and 
how such choices promote narcissism.
We considered charity as an example of consumer choices with low self-referent process-
ing. Other examples are gift giving or making purchases for collectives (e.g., family, friends, 
partners) rather than for the self. Yet, self-image concerns have been apparent in some of 
these research streams, too. For example, when the giver’s identity is in conflict with the gift, 
gift giving represents an identity threat, which can motivate compensatory consumption 
to restore one’s self-image (Ward & Broniarczyk, 2011). In this case, gift giving is likely to 
endorse intensive thoughts about the self and the threatened identity. In line with such 
theorizing, this could be a situation where choice, even though in a gift giving context, 
elevates narcissism through self-referencing. In addition, charitable giving can be motivated 
not only by selfless but also by selfish altruism (Krishna, 2011). Again, it is the degree of 
self-referencing that will determine the resulting level of narcissism rather than an a priori 
and dichotomous definition of the situation as self-referent or other-referent. More broadly, 
we suggest that accounting for the degree of self-referent processing involved in choosing 
can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of decision-making processes.
Our findings have theoretical implications for research on consumption and identity as 
well as practical implications for the effectiveness of marketing trends. In recent years, the 
marketplace has been characterized by a remarkable growth of consumer choice (Broniarczyk 
& Griffin, 2014; Kahn et al., 2014; Mick et al., 2004). Critically, not only do consumers have 
more options than ever before, but also domains not traditionally considered a matter of 
choice are now viewed as such. The rise of mass product customization explicates this trend, 
as it gives consumers the opportunity to tailor products to their individual taste (Simonson, 
2005). For example, consumers can customize their Nike sneakers by choosing several fea-
tures at each step of the product configuration process and finally create their own unique 
product. Features for which consumers had no choice (e.g., which color the sole should be 
or whether air cushions should be visible) are now open to it, and indeed require it. These 
trends in the marketplace resonate with wider societal changes, where identities are not 
fixed or inherited, but are rather shaped through self-expressive choice (Giddens, 1991; 
Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004). Prior work has shown that construing simple everyday acts as 
choices has controversial consequences at the interpersonal level, such as lower concern 
about wealth inequality (Savani & Rattan, 2012) and lower support of policies promoting 
societal welfare (Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2011). Our research further suggests that 
increasingly construing life domains as a matter of choice affords more opportunities to 
engage in self-referencing, which in turn may give rise to narcissism. If individuals become 
more narcissistic due to choice-induced self-referencing, they may also become more 
demanding and harder to satisfy as consumers (Boyd & Helms, 2005). Ironically, widespread 
provision of choice might backfire, making consumers more narcissistic or entitled. Research 
on this topic would enrich the product customization literature, which has mostly been 
concerned with benefits of product customization such as higher valuation of and satisfac-
tion with customized products (Franke, Schreier, & Kaiser, 2010). Product customization, 
however, may have unanticipated consequences. Giving consumers the chance to construe 
all steps of the product design process as self-expressive choices may involve extensive 
self-referencing with the possibility of augmenting narcissism and contributing to highly 
demanding consumers.
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Our research has several potential limitations. To begin, it examined the effect of consumer 
choices on narcissism with hypothetical choices that did not entail costs for participants. 
However, the financial aspect did not play a role in the theorizing; on the contrary, the designs 
tried to control for such concerns by asking participants to choose irrespective of budget 
constraints. By doing so, the studies focused primarily on the psychological process of choos-
ing. Moreover, our research engaged in a stringent test of the hypotheses, using a minimal 
experimental design involving only hypothetical choices and naturally occurring underlying 
mechanisms. In real-life situations or with designs using incentivized choices, one would 
expect the effects to be even stronger. Another potential limitation is that, as a foray into 
these issues, we addressed only one path from choice to narcissism. Besides self-referencing, 
other variables could be of relevance, such as power. Future empirical efforts would need 
to assess additional variables that might influence the choice-narcissism relation. Follow-up 
work would also need to test the replicability of our findings in varied cultural contexts. 
Finally, although our experimental setup satisfied the first part of the sequential ignorability 
assumption for causal mediation analysis through random assignment of participants to 
conditions, the setup did not satisfy the second part of the assumption (Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 
2010). That is, whereas we can conclude that the choice-to-self-referencing, and choice-to-
state narcissism, relations are unconfounded by unmeasured variables, we cannot conclude 
that the self-referencing-to-state narcissism relation is unconfounded by such variables. 
Follow-up work would need to address this issue by randomly assigning participants to 
different self-referencing conditions.
This research is the first to examine how the act of making consumer choices – a ubiqui-
tous practice that lies at the heart of consumption (Rick et al., 2014) – influences narcissism. 
The findings add to a growing body of research challenging the view that choice is uncon-
ditionally beneficial for individual or societal well-being (Markus & Schwartz, 2010; Schwartz 
& Cheek, 2017). Moreover, the research enriches the consumer psychology literature on 
narcissism (Cisek et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Sedikides et al., 2007) with a novel perspective, 
suggesting that narcissism can be treated as a state that is temporarily elevated in a consumer 
context by self-referent processing as a result of the act of choosing. With rising opportunities 
for consumer choices (Kahn et al., 2014; Mick et al., 2004) and rising levels of narcissism 
(Twenge & Campbell, 2009; Twenge & Foster, 2010), these issues are becoming more topical 
and deserving of empirical scrutiny.
Notes
1.  Whereas some narcissists satisfy self-motives of grandiosity, esteem, entitlement, and power in 
agentic domains (Jones & Brunell, 2014; Morf et al., 2011; Thomaes et al., 2018), other narcissists 
satisfy the same motives in communal domains (Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 2012; 
Giacomin & Jordan, 2015; Luo, Cai, Sedikides, & Song, 2014). The former are termed agentic 
narcissists, the latter communal. In the current research, we focused exclusively on agentic 
narcissism.
2.  We wish to clarify our use of the terms total effect, direct effect, and indirect effect (Hayes, 
2013). By total effect, we refer to the influence of choice on state narcissism. By direct effect, we 
refer to the influence of choice on state narcissism after controlling for self-referencing. Finally, 
by indirect effect, we refer to the influence of choice on state narcissism via self-referencing.
3.  In all experiments, in addition to the analyses presented above, we tested a multiple mediation 
model with self-referencing and self-esteem as parallel mediators. In Experiments 1 and 3, 
mediation was significant only through self-referencing, not through self-esteem. In Experiment 
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2, neither mediator was significant when we entered them together. (Results are available upon 
request.) On balance, and until further evidence accumulates, we conclude that mediation is 
significant via self-referencing, but not necessarily via self-esteem. This is further corroborated 
by the fact that, in Experiment 2, there was no main effect of choice on self-esteem.
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Appendix
NPI-14
Read each pair of statements below and select the one that comes closest to describing your current 
feelings and beliefs about yourself. You may feel that neither statement describes you well, but pick 
the one that comes closest. Please complete all pairs.
___ Right now, I would prefer to be a leader. (N)
___ It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not, right now.
___ Right now, I am not sure if I would make a good leader.
___ I see myself as a good leader, right now. (N)
___ I think I depend on other people to get things done, right now.
___ Right now, I think I am unlikely to depend on anyone else to get things done. (N)
___ I feel more capable than other people, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I feel there is a lot I can learn from other people.
___ I think I am much like everybody else, right now.
___ Right now, I think I am an extraordinary person. (N)
___ Right now, compliments embarrass me.
___ I like to be complimented, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I try not to be a show off.
___ I will show off if I get a chance, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I feel modesty doesn’t become me. (N)
___ I feel I am essentially a modest person, right now.
___ Right now, I can read people like a book. (N)
___ I feel people are sometimes hard to understand, right now.
___ Right now, People might believe what I tell them.
___ I can make anybody believe anything I want them to, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I think my body is nothing special.
___ I like to look at my body, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I like to look at myself in the mirror. (N)
___ I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror, right now.
___ Right now, I feel I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve. (N)
___ I take my satisfactions as they come, right now.
___ I expect a great deal from other people, right now. (N)
___ Right now, I like to do things for other people.
N = Indicates answers that are coded as narcissistic.
